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Abstract
Granger-Geweke causality (GGC) is a powerful and popular method for identifying directed functional (‘causal’) connectivity in
neuroscience. In a recent paper, Stokes and Purdon (2017) raise several concerns about its use. They make two primary claims: (1)
that GGC estimates may be severely biased or of high variance, and (2) that GGC fails to reveal the full structural/causal mechanisms
of a system. However, these claims rest, respectively, on an incomplete evaluation of the literature, and a misconception about what
GGC can be said to measure. Here we explain how existing approaches [as implemented, for example, in our popular MVGC
software (Barnett and Seth, 2012)] resolve the first issue, and discuss the frequently-misunderstood distinction between functional
and effective neural connectivity which underlies Stokes and Purdon’s second claim.
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Granger-Geweke causality (GGC) is a powerful analysis
method for inferring directed functional (‘causal’) connectivity
from time-series data, which has become increasingly popular
in a variety of neuroimaging contexts (Seth et al., 2015). GGC
operationalises a statistical, predictive notion of causality in
which causes precede, and help predict their effects. When im-
plemented using autoregressive modelling, GGC can be com-
puted in both time and frequency domains, in both bivariate and
multivariate (conditional) formulations. Despite its popularity
and power, the use of GGC in neuroscience and neuroimaging
has remained controversial. In a recent paper, Stokes and Pur-
don (2017) raise two primary concerns: (1) that GGC estimates
may be severely biased or of high variance, and (2) that GGC
fails to reveal the full structural/causal mechanisms of a system.
Here, we explain why these concerns are misplaced.
Regarding the first claim, Stokes and Purdon (2017) de-
scribe how bias and variance in GGC estimation arise from
the use of separate, independent, full and reduced regressions.
However, this problem has long been recognised (Chen et al.,
2006; Barnett and Seth, 2014) and, moreover, has already been
solved by methods which derive GGC from a single full re-
gression1. These methods essentially extract reduced model
parameters from the full model via factorisation of the spectral
density matrix. Well-documented approaches include Wilson’s
frequency-domain algorithm (Dhamala et al., 2008), Whittle’s
time-domain algorithm (Barnett and Seth, 2014), and a state-
space approach which devolves to solution of a discrete-time
algebraic Riccati equation (Barnett and Seth, 2015; Solo, 2016).
1We note here that the “partition matrix” solution proposed by Chen et al.
(2006) is incorrect; see, e.g., Solo (2016).
Thus, the source of bias and variance discussed in Stokes and
Purdon (2017) has already been resolved.
This is clearly illustrated in Fig. 1, where we plot estimated
frequency-domain GGC for the 3-node VAR model in Stokes
and Purdon (2017), Example 1, using the single-regression
state-space method (Barnett and Seth, 2015; Solo, 2016). We
remark that identical results are obtained using the time-domain
spectral factorisation method of Barnett and Seth (2014), as im-
plemented in the current (v1.0, 2012) release of the associated
MVGC Matlab c© software package (Barnett and Seth, 2012).
Fig. 1 may be directly compared with Fig. 2 in Stokes and Pur-
don (2017); we see clearly that all estimates are strictly non-
negative, and that exaggerated bias and variance associated with
the dual-regression approach are absent. Therefore, Stokes and
Purdon (2017) are in error when they state that “Barnett and
Seth [. . . ] have proposed fitting the reduced model and using it
to directly compute the spectral components . . . ”. This is im-
portant to note because our MVGC toolbox has been widely
adopted within the community, with > 3, 500 downloads and a
significant number of high-impact research publications using
the method (e.g., Yellin et al., 2015; Bruneau et al., 2015; Place
et al., 2016; Schmitt et al., 2017; Wilber et al., 2017). Thus, we
can reassure users of the toolbox that problems of bias and vari-
ance as described by Stokes and Purdon (2017) do not apply.
Sample variance is, of course, still evident, as is bias due
to non-negativity of the GGC sample statistic (which may be
countered by standard surrogate data methods), but both re-
main well below their minimum values across all model or-
ders for the dual-regression case (as evidenced by Stokes and
Purdon, 2017, Fig. 2). Fig. 2 further compares bias and vari-
ance of time-domain GGC for the example system for single
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Figure 1: Granger-Geweke frequency-domain causalities estimated by the
single-regression state-space method (Barnett and Seth, 2015; Solo, 2016) for
the 3-node VAR model in Stokes and Purdon (2017), (Example 1, cf. Fig. 2).
The true model order of 3 was used for the (single, full-model) VAR estimates.
Plots are based on 10, 000 time series realisations of 500 observations: red lines
plot the exact causality for the model and blue lines sample estimate medians.
The shaded areas indicate 90% central confidence intervals, while the green
lines plot. The dashed horizontal lines indicate critical thresholds over all fre-
quencies [see Stokes and Purdon (2017), Supporting Information, S9] at 95%
significance, derived from simulation of the corresponding null model.
and dual regressions, at model order 3, across a wide-range of
time-series lengths. A single regression consistently leads to
substantially less bias and variance, except at high time-series
lengths, where there is a drop off of bias and variance for both
methods.
Stokes and Purdon (2017) do correctly identify a fundamen-
tal cause of the problem with dual-regression GGC estimation:
even if the full process is a finite-order autoregression, the re-
duced process will generally not be finite-order autoregressive;
rather, it will be VARMA, or equivalently, a finite-order state-
space process (Hannan and Deistler, 2012) – which may be
poorly modelled as a finite-order VAR (Barnett and Seth, 2014).
The problem is in fact more pervasive than this: the full pro-
cess itself may have a strong moving-average (MA) component
and be poorly-modelled as a finite-order VAR. This is because
common features of neurophysiological data acquisition, sam-
pling and preprocessing procedures such as subsampling and
other temporal aggregation, filtering, measurement noise and
sub-process extraction will all, in general, induce an MA com-
ponent (Barnett and Seth, 2011; Seth et al., 2013; Solo, 2016).
This is particularly pertinent to fMRI data, where the haemody-
namic response acts as a slow, MA filter. Fortunately, the state-
space and non-parametric approaches mentioned above handle
VARMA data parsimoniously, hence avoiding this problem.
Moving on to the second claim, Stokes and Purdon note that
GGC reflects a combination of ‘transmitter’ and ‘channel’ dy-
namics, and is independent of ‘receiver’ dynamics. Again, this
independence has been previously identified, as a direct con-
sequence of the invariance of GGC under certain affine trans-
formations (Barrett et al., 2010; Barnett and Seth, 2011). But
why should this independence matter? They suggest that it runs
“counter to intuitive notions of causality intended to explain ob-
served effects” since, according to them, “neuroscientists seek
to determine the mechanisms that produce ‘effects’ within a
neural system or circuit as a function of inputs or ‘causes’ ob-
served at other locations”. In fact, this view resonates more
strongly with approaches such as Dynamic Causal Modelling
(DCM; Friston et al., 2003)—usually characterised as ‘effective
connectivity’—which attempt to find the optimal mechanistic
(circuit-level) description that explains observed data. GGC,
on the other hand, models dependencies among observed re-
sponses and is therefore an example of (directed) ‘functional
connectivity’ (see Seth et al., 2015; Friston et al., 2013, for
in-depth comparison). Essentially, the distinction is between
making inferences about an underlying physical causal mech-
anism (DCM; Valdes-Sosa et al., 2011) and making inferences
about directed information flow (GGC; Barnett et al., 2009).
DCM is able to deliver evidence for circuit-level descriptions of
neural mechanism from a limited repertoire of tightly-framed
hypotheses, which must be independently motivated and vali-
dated (Stephan et al., 2010); it is, in particular, unsuited to ex-
ploratory analyses. GGC, on the other hand, is data-driven and
“data-agnostic” (it makes few assumptions about the genera-
tive process, beyond that it be reasonably parsimoniously mod-
elled as a linear stochastic system), and as such is well-suited
to exploratory analyses. It delivers an information-theoretic in-
terpretation of the neural process which is both amenable to
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Figure 2: Granger-Geweke time-domain causality bias (left column) and vari-
ance (right column) for estimation by the single-regression state-space method
(red lines) and dual-regression method (blue lines), plotted aganst time series
length, for the example 3-node VAR model in Stokes and Purdon (2017). Bias is
measured as the difference between the sample median and true causality, while
variance is measured as the mean absolute deviation of the sample causality (we
use non-parametric measures, as the GGC sample estimators are non-negative,
non-Gaussian, and potentially highly skewed). The true model order of 3 was
used for all VAR estimates. Plots are based on 10, 000 time series realisations
for each number of observations.
statistical inference, and which also stands as an effect size for
directed information flow between components of the system
(Barrett and Barnett, 2013). Both approaches address valid
questions of interest to neuroscientific analysis.
Concluding, GGC represents a conceptually satisfying and
statistically powerful method for (directed) functional connec-
tivity analysis in neuroscience and neuroimaging. Currently
available implementations [e.g., Barnett and Seth (2012)] deal
appropriately with issues of bias and variance associated with
dual regression methods. However, a range of additional
challenges remain in further developing this useful technique.
These include issues of stationarity, linearity and exogenous in-
fluences, as noted by Stokes and Purdon (2017), and in addition
the influences of noise, sampling rates and temporal/spatial ag-
gregation engendered by neural data acquisition (Solo, 2016;
Barnett and Seth, 2017).
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